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REQUESTS RESULT IN HIGHER AWARDS 
THAN ROUND REQUESTS 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a setting where someone asks two people what the temperature is 
outside.  The first person says it is 80 °F, while the second person says it is 78.7 
°F. Research regarding precise versus round cognitive anchoring suggests that 
the second person is more likely to be believed.1  This is because it is human 
nature to assume that if someone gives a precise answer, he must have good 
reason for doing so.2  This principle remains constant in a variety of settings, 
including used car negotiations,3 eBay transactions,4 and estimating the field 
goal percentage of a basketball player.5
* Powell Endowed Professor of Business Law, Angelo State University. For a TED Talk 
the author gave on the subject of cognitive anchoring, see TEDx Talks, Anchoring | Michael 
Conklin | TEDxGrandJunction, YOUTUBE (Oct. 17, 2018), https://youtu.be/UvF2wl03iX4. 
 1. See, e.g., Malia F. Mason, Alice J. Lee, Elizabeth A. Wiley & Daniel R. Ames, Precise 
Offers are Potent Anchors: Conciliatory Counteroffers and Attributions of Knowledge in Negotia-
tions, 49 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 759 (2013). 
 2. See id. at 762. 
 3. See David D. Loschelder, Johannes Stuppi & Roman Trotschel, “€14,875?!”: Precision 
Boosts the Anchoring Potency of First Offers, 5 SOC. PSYCH. & PERS. SCI. 491, 491 (2013). 
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This Article reports the results of a first-of-its-kind study involving over 
600 participants designed to measure if this same principle applies to punitive 
damage requests from plaintiffs’ attorneys.  In other words, can a plaintiff’s at-
torney increase the punitive damages awarded simply by requesting $497,000 
instead of $500,000.  The stark differences produced from such a subtle and 
costless change provide a valuable strategy for plaintiffs’ attorneys, a cautionary 
warning for civil defense attorneys, and constructive insight into the subjective 
nature of juror decision-making. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A.  The Anchoring Effect Generally 
The cognitive heuristic known as the anchoring effect was first researched 
in the landmark 1974 paper by Nobel Prize-winning psychologists Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman.6  It is now a well-researched conclusion that 
higher initial offers in a negotiation result in higher final prices.7  This effect is 
attributed to cognitive anchoring, which is a behavioral bias whereby infor-
mation a person is exposed to disproportionately affects a future decision.8  An-
choring reaches this result by changing the reference point that people use to 
make judgements.9  When an anchor is set, future judgements are made in rela-
tion to the anchor instead of being based on a neutral examination of the availa-
ble evidence.10
For example, consider two people negotiating the price of a used car that is 
worth around $8,000.  If the seller makes the initial offer by stating he will sell 
it for $10,000, this sets a high anchor for the negotiation.  The buyer is likely to 
view a satisfactory final price based on how far it deviates down from the 
$10,000 anchor.  Therefore, a final price of $8,000 is viewed as a great success 
 4. See Matthew Backus, Tom Blake & Steven Tadelis, Cheap Talk, Round Numbers, and 
the Economics of Negotiation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 21285, 2015), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w21285.pdf. 
 5. Chris Janiszewski & Dan Uy, Precision of the Anchor Influences the Amount of Adjust-
ment, 19 PSYCH. SCI. 121, 122 (2008). 
 6. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, (1974). 
7. See Loschelder, Stuppi & Trotschel, supra note 3, at 491 (“In negotiations, higher first 
offers from sellers drive up sale prices—reversely, buyers benefit from lower first offers. Whereas 
abundant research has replicated this robust anchoring effect of opening offers . . . ”). 
 8. Eva M. Krockow, Outsmart the Anchoring Bias in Three Simple Steps, PSYCH. TODAY:
STRETCHING THEORY (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/stretching-
theory/201902/outsmart-the-anchoring-bias-in-three-simple-steps (defining cognitive anchoring as 
“the automatic processes of identifying available information to provide a focal point or a baseline 
for our judgement”).
 9. Id. 
 10. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 6, at 1128. 
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because it is $2,000 less than the anchor.  Had the seller’s initial offer been 
$8,500, the negotiation would have been anchored to that number, and a final 
price of $8,000 would be perceived as less satisfactory, as it is only $500 less 
than the anchor. 
The anchoring effect is present in various situations in the legal field.  Be-
cause civil damage awards are often the result of complex, non-standard deci-
sions, there is an increased risk that juries will rely on cognitive heuristics when 
reaching their verdicts.11  This often results in systemic biases such as anchor-
ing, in which the plaintiff’s attorney’s request greatly influences the jury’s 
award regardless of the facts of the case.12  A 1990 mock jury study presented 
participants with a civil case summary and one of three damage requests by the 
plaintiff’s attorney.13  The requests were either $10,000, $75,000, or $150,000.14
The results demonstrated that the mock jurors were heavily anchored to the 
plaintiff’s attorney’s request.  Average awards were $18,000, $62,800, and 
$101,400, respectively.15  A later 1996 study confirmed this same anchoring ef-
fect on personal injury awards.  Simply put, for both punitive and compensatory 
damages, the more the plaintiff’s attorney asks for, the more the jury awards.16
Juror’s lack of legal experience places them at a heightened risk of suc-
cumbing to the anchoring effect.17  But even judges, who routinely make legal 
judgments and possess high levels of education18 are not immune from the an-
 11. See generally Michael J. Seitz, Nikolai W. F. Bode & Gerta Koster, How Cognitive Heu-
ristics Can Explain Social Interactions in Spatial Movement, 13 J. ROYAL SOC’Y INTERFACE 1, 1 
(2016) (defining a cognitive heuristic as a mental shortcut that allows one to make a decision with-
out the time-consuming task of finding the optimal solution, noting that the common practice of its 
use faces a complex cognitive task, and noting that the practice often leads to systematic biases such 
as anchoring). 
 12. Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask for, the More You Get: 
Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCH. 519, 522 (1996). 
 13. Allan Raitz, Edith Greene, Jane Goodman & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Determining Damages: 
The Influence of Expert Testimony on Jurors’ Decision Making, 14 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 385, 387 
(1990) (citing J.J. Zuehl, The Ad Damnum, Jury Instructions, and Personal Injury Damage Awards 
(Aug. 4, 1982) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Chicago Law Review)). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Neal R. Feigenson, Can Tort Juries Punish Competently?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
239, 266 (2003) (punitive damages); Raitz, Greene, Goodman & Loftus, supra note 13, at 387 (cit-
ing Zuehl, supra note 13) (noting that for compensatory damages, when the request was varied from 
$10,000 to $75,000 to $150,000, the mock jurors awarded $18,000, $62,800, and $101,400 respec-
tively). 
 17. See generally Seitz, Bode & Koster, supra note 11. 
 18. Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, On the Relative Independence of Thinking Biases 
and Cognitive Ability, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 672 (2008) (finding that cognitive ability 
is largely not correlated to the ability to successfully avoid biases such as cognitive anchoring). 
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choring effect.19  A 2001 study found that a judge’s sentence in a criminal trial 
is significantly affected by the suggested sentence of the prosecutor.20
Anchoring studies regarding non-legal subjects have found that anchors are 
effective even when they are blatantly absurd.  One study asked students if they 
thought their textbook for a class would cost more or less than $7,128.53, fol-
lowed by a question asking them how much they predicted their textbook would 
cost.21  This resulted in significantly higher estimates than a group that was only 
asked to predict the cost of their textbook without the $7,128.53 anchor.22  Simi-
larly, a study asking people if the temperature in San Francisco was more or less 
than 558 °F, followed by asking them what they estimated the temperature to 
be, resulted in significantly higher estimates than a control group that was not 
anchored to 558 °F.23
Even when participants are aware that the anchor point is completely arbi-
trary, it still biases their judgment.  In the landmark Tversky and Kahneman an-
choring study of 1974, one experiment had participants spin a large wheel num-
bered one through one hundred.24  Participants were then asked to guess if the 
number of United Nations countries in Africa was greater than or less than this 
number.25  Finally, they were asked to guess what the actual number of United 
Nations countries in Africa was.26  Despite participants knowing that the initial 
number was random and therefore irrelevant to the correct answer, those whose 
spin resulted in a higher number had higher guesses as to the actual number of 
countries.27
Subtle, irrelevant anchors have been shown to affect decisions in legal set-
tings as well.  A 2019 study demonstrated how jurors in a criminal case can be 
manipulated into rendering different sentences by simply including either large 
or small numbers into irrelevant details in a case study.28  The study randomly 
 19. Chapman & Bornstein, supra note 12, at 521. 
 20. Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty: Anchoring Effects 
in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 1535, 1538–41 (2001) (finding that a suggested two-
month sentence resulted in an average sentence of 18.78 months, while a suggested thirty-four-
month sentence resulted in an average sentence of 28.7 months). 
 21. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 788 (2001) (citing SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND 
DECISION MAKING 146 (1993)). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 788–89 (citing PLOUS, supra note 21, at 146). 
 24. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 6, at 1128. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. (To simplify the data set, the wheel was rigged to stop at either ten or sixty-five. For 
participants whose wheel stopped at ten, their average estimate as to how many United Nations 
countries were in Africa was twenty-five. For participants whose wheel landed on sixty-five, their 
average estimate was forty-five.).
 28. Michael Conklin, Combating Arbitrary Jurisprudence by Addressing Anchoring Bias, 97 
WASH. U. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2019). 
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assigned one of two case summaries to mock jurors.29  The high-number case 
summary mentioned Eighty-First Street, March 31st, and a forty-five-minute 
time period.30  The low-number case summary mentioned First Street, March 
2nd, and a three-minute time period.31  Despite all other facts in the case sum-
maries being identical, mock jurors who read the high-number case summary 
returned sentences that were 31% higher than those in the low-number group.32
B.  Precise Versus Round Anchors 
Cognitive anchoring is present in more situations than just when high initial 
numbers yield a higher end result.  A 2013 study analyzed how the use of pre-
cise numbers (such as $1,486), compared to round numbers (such as $1,500), 
also elicited the anchoring effect.33  The results of the study demonstrate that 
when a precise number is initially presented in a negotiation, the other side is 
more likely to assume the number is based on subject-matter knowledge com-
pared to when a round number is initially presented.34  Therefore, precise nu-
merical expressions imply a greater level of knowledge than round numerical 
expressions.  This causes recipients to believe that precise numerical expres-
sions are more informative of the true value of the item being negotiated, re-
gardless of whether they actually are.35  This belief—that there is a good, objec-
tive reason for the precise, initial figure provided—results in counteroffers that 
deviate less from the original offer than when round numbers are initially 
used.36
A 2008 study involving five experiments produced the same result and pro-
vided a more detailed explanation.37  The study explained that adjustments away 
from the anchor point are viewed along a subjective representational scale.38
The perceived “resolution” of this scale is affected by whether the anchor is a 
precise or round number.39  Precise numbers function to create a more finely 
tuned scale than round numbers.40  Therefore, deviations from the anchor ap-
pear to be more severe—i.e., moving through more tick marks on the imaginary 
 29. Id. at 4. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Mason et al., supra note 1. 
 34. Id. at 762. 
 35. Id. at 759; see also Alexandra Jerez-Fernandez et al., Show Me the Numbers: Precision 
as a Cue to Others’ Confidence, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 633, 633 (2013). 
 36. Mason et al., supra note 1, at 760. 
 37. Janiszewski & Uy, supra note 5. 
 38. Id. at 126. 
 39. Id.
 40. Id.
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scale—when a precise anchor is used.41  For example, a counteroffer of $1,300 
for an item listed at $1,500 is likely to be perceived on a scale that utilizes $100 
increments.  Therefore, on such a scale, this counteroffer is only two units lower 
than the initial asking price.  Conversely, if the initial price was $1,490, a per-
ceived scale with $10 increments would be utilized.  Here, a $1,300 counterof-
fer would be nineteen units lower than the initial asking price.  While the latter 
counteroffer as a percent of the initial offer is objectively less, it is likely to be 
perceived as more extreme because of the more finely tuned scale used to view 
it.
A 2015 study found that eBay sellers who list items in multiples of $100 re-
ceive offers that are 5% to 8% lower than similarly-situated sellers who use 
more “precise” values.42  The study concluded that round numbers are used as a 
“cheap-talk tool” by sellers to communicate to buyers that they are willing to 
reduce the price in order to make a sale.43  Meaning, a seller who desires expe-
diency over maximizing the sale price will list an item for $200 instead of 
$198.44  The $198 starting price would eventually lead to a higher sale price, but 
the $200 listing price will receive offers sooner.45
This precise number effect appears to have no limit.  A 2014 study found 
that while moderately precise offers are more effective than round offers, highly 
precise offers are even more effective than moderately precise offers.46  There is 
also strong evidence to suggest that the anchoring effects of precise numbers are 
present in many instances other than traditional buyer–seller negotiations.  Stud-
ies have found that precise anchors result in higher responses than round an-
chors in a variety of categories.  These include estimating the amount of protein 
in a beverage, cost of cheese, height of a car, life of a pen, and field goal per-
centage of a basketball player.47
C.  Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages were selected as the numerical variable in this research 
because their inherently subjective nature is ideal for the anchoring.  Punitive 
damages are damages awarded in civil cases beyond mere compensatory dam-
 41. Id.
 42. Backus et al., supra note 4 (noting that for the type of listings used in this study, eBay is 
less like an auction and more like a face-to-face negotiation in which a seller lists a product for a 
given price and potential buyers can make lesser best offers that the seller can then choose to accept 
or provide a counteroffer to). 
 43. Id. at 2. 
 44. Id. at 1. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Loschelder, Stuppi & Trotschel, supra note 3, at 496 (Consistent with other negotiation 
studies regarding precise offers, the authors concluded that increased precision in the initial offer 
likely enhances the perceived credibility and expertise of the person who made it. This in turn in-
creases the potency of the anchoring effect of the initial offer.). 
 47. Janiszewski & Uy, supra note 5, at 122. 
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ages.48  They are rare, occurring in only 6% of civil cases that result in a mone-
tary award.49  Their purpose is not to compensate the plaintiff but rather to pun-
ish the defendant and deter similar conduct in the future.50  They require the de-
fendant’s conduct to be “outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or 
his reckless indifference to the rights of others.”51  Therefore, punitive damages 
are inherently subjective.  This subjective nature makes it difficult to provide  
meaningful jury instructions on the matter.52
Notable punitive damage awards cases illustrate the inconsistent nature of 
how they are determined.  In Ammerman v. Ford Motor Company,53 the jury 
awarded $58 million in punitive damages for the rollover problem in the Ford 
Bronco II.54  This figure was arrived at by multiplying the 700,000 Bronco II 
sales by the $83 per unit that Ford projected it would cost to address the rollover 
problem.55  In a case involving a design defect in a 1979 Chevy Malibu, the jury 
based its $4.8 billion punitive damage award on General Motors’ advertising 
budget.56  In BMW v. Gore,57 the jury awarded $4 million in damages due to 
BMW’s practice of repainting cars damaged by acid rain and then selling them 
as new without notifying the customer.58  This punitive damage award was 
based on the compensatory damages of $4,000 per automobile times the 1,000 
refinished BMW automobiles.59  This lack of objectivity and inconsistent appli-
cation have led some experts to refer to the determination of punitive damages 
as “voodoo economics.”60
The inconsistencies in punitive damages calculations are not limited to trial 
courts.  Appellate court justices also apply dubious logic when they adjudicate 
on punitive damage awards.  In the BMW v. Gore case, the Alabama Supreme 
 48. Punitive Damages, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu
/wex/punitive_damages (last visited Dec. 3, 2020). 
 49. Brian J. Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in the 1990s,
79 JUDICATURE 233, 237–38 (1996). 
 50. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Impli-
cations for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 110 (2002). 
 51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 52. Keith Schneider, Exxon Is Ordered to Pay $5 Billion for Alaska Spill, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
17, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/17/us/exxon-is-ordered-to-pay-5-billion-for-alaska-
spill.html (“[I]t is difficult to give a jury meaningful standards to determine in money what will con-
stitute punishment or deterrence.”). 
 53. Ammerman v. Ford Motor Co., No. 49D05-9311-CT-1305, (Ind. Super. Ct., Oct. 5, 
1995), aff’d, 705 N.E.2d 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). 
 54. Daniel E. Becnel, Jr., An Overview of Complex Product Liability Litigation in the USA,
20 INT’L J. FATIGUE 93, 96 (1998). 
 55. Id.
 56. Id.
 57. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 58. W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547, 564–
65 (2000). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 577. 
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Court reduced the $4 million punitive damage award down to $2 million.61  The 
stated rationale was that the jury improperly considered injuries to consumers 
outside Alabama.62  Not allowing an Alabama court to punish a defendant for 
harm incurred by those who purchased a vehicle outside of Alabama is justi-
fied.63  But reducing the punitive damages from $4 million to $2 million does 
not logically follow.  Only 14 of the refurbished vehicles were sold in Alabama, 
which is just 1.4% of the 983 refinished automobiles BMW sold nationwide—
not 50%, as the 50% reduction in punitive damages would imply.64
Even the U.S. Supreme Court has struggled to provide guidance regarding 
punitive damage awards.  It has stated that the ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages should generally not exceed 9:1.65  But the Supreme 
Court has also “consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is 
marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and 
potential damages to the punitive award.”66  This 9:1 ratio is not only inconsist-
ently applied but is also entirely arbitrary.  The ratio of compensatory to puni-
tive damages has little direct relevance to the ultimate purposes of punitive 
damages—deterrence and punishment for exceptionally egregious conduct.67
Extensive research has already been conducted in other aspects of punitive 
damage calculations by jurors.  The following is a sample of the findings: 
   The perceived reprehensibility of the defendant’s behavior affects pu-
nitive damage awards.68
   The defendant’s level of wealth is positively correlated with larger pu-
nitive damage awards.69
   Jurors are generally not capable of producing optimal deterrence.70
 61. Paul H. Rubin, John E. Calfee & Mark F. Grady, BMW v Gore: Mitigating the Punitive 
Economics of Punitive Damages, 5 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 179, 180 (1997). 
 62. Id.
 63.  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996). 
 64. Rubin et al., supra note 61 (“The Alabama Supreme Court reduced the punitive damages 
award to $2 million because the jury should not have considered injuries to consumers outside Ala-
bama, but the court did not explain further how it calculated the $2 million award figure.”). 
 65. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (“[I]n practice, 
few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a signifi-
cant degree, will satisfy due process.”). Previously the Supreme Court hinted that a ratio of 4:1 
might be “close to the line of constitutional impropriety.” Id. at 425 (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1991)). 
 66. Gore, 517 U.S.  at 582 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 
458 (1993). 
 67. Robbennolt, supra note 50, at 110. 
 68. Id. at 121. 
 69. Id. at 123. 
 70. See id. at 130–34 (explaining that “jurors appear to award punitive damages primarily to 
punish wrongdoers and to express their outrage at the defendant’s outrageous conduct rather than to 
effect optimal deterrence”); see also Feigenson, supra note 16, at 266 (explaining that optimal de-
terrence is “the idea that in regulating risky behavior, legal decision-makers ought to encourage ac-
tors to avoid only those accidents worth avoiding”). 
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   Jurors punish defendants who conduct cost-benefit analyses.71
   Jurors give higher punitive damage awards when the plaintiff’s attor-
ney links the request to an objective figure.72
   Jurors likely underestimate the frequency and severity of punitive 
damages in the legal system.73
   Jurors downplay, ignore, or are otherwise incapable of following jury 
instructions when reaching a punitive damages determination.74
   Jurors overestimate the likelihood of an event occurring if they are 
aware that the event did occur, thus succumbing to hindsight bias.75
   Juries overestimate the likelihood of low-probability risks and there-
fore are more likely to punish defendants through punitive damage 
awards for not doing more to avoid low-probability risks.76
III. METHODOLOGY AND PREDICTIONS
The survey was administered online to 609 participants in the summer of 
2020. The average age of the participants was twenty-nine.77  Male participants 
comprised 60.8% of the respondents, and female participants comprised 39.2%. 
Three different versions of the survey were utilized.  After a series of demo-
graphic questions,78 a summary of a products liability case with a punitive dam-
ages request was presented, and participants were asked what amount—if any—
they would award in punitive damages.  The punitive damages requested by the 
plaintiff’s attorney in the case summary was either $497,000 (precise low), 
$500,000 (round), or $503,000 (precise high).  Everything else regarding the 
 71. Feigenson, supra note 16, at 268–71. Mock juries awarded significantly greater punitive 
damage awards to a defendant who conducted a cost-benefit analysis than one that did not. Id. Fur-
thermore, the higher the dollar value of human life that was utilized in the defendant’s cost-benefit 
analysis, the higher the punitive judgment against them. Id. This is a highly peculiar finding because 
the practice of businesses performing a cost-benefit analysis is beneficial to society, not harmful. 
And placing a higher dollar value on human life in these calculations is laudable, not blameworthy. 
 72. Michael Conklin, Factors Affecting Punitive Damage Awards, ___ FLA. COASTAL L.
REV. at *8–9 (forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3615013 (finding that when a $2 mil-
lion punitive damages request was described as two days’ worth of the defendant’s revenue, mock 
jurors returned verdicts 11% higher than when the $2 million request was not linked to any other 
figure; In both instances the defendant’s revenue was provided).
 73. Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the Media as 
Your Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort Litigation, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 419 
(1996). 
 74. Feigenson, supra note 16, at 266 (“[Jurors] seem incapable of following instructions to 
take deterrence into account as a goal of their punitive awards.”); Id. at 274 (noting that 85% of 
mock jurors either did not fill out a required punitive damages computational form or filled it out 
incorrectly). 
 75. Id. at 264–65. 
 76. Id. at 267. 
 77. In order to protect anonymity, age ranges were provided instead of asking for the partici-
pants’ exact age. Therefore, the survey average age of twenty-nine is an approximation. 
 78. These included gender, age, race, education, religion, and political affiliation. 
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case summary remained constant.  The complete language of the case summary 
is provided in Appendix A. 
It was hypothesized that—consistent with the existing research on precise 
opening offers in traditional negotiations—the two precise punitive damage 
award requests would result in higher average awards than the round request. 
Furthermore, it was hypothesized that this difference would be even more sub-
stantial than in other studies regarding the effects of precise numbers.  This lat-
ter prediction is based on evidence that suggests the power of the anchoring ef-
fect is inversely related to the level of subject-matter knowledge.79  Because 
punitive damages are inherently subjective, this should result in highly disparate 
results. 
Given the broad power of the anchoring effect, it was further hypothesized 
that the increased effectiveness of the precise requests would remain constant 
regardless of the demographic backgrounds of the participants.  It was hypothe-
sized that males and conservatives would, on average, award lower punitive 
damage amounts due to their more “pro-business” mindset.  However, this re-
sult is ultimately irrelevant to the findings of the study, which was designed to 
measure the difference in punitive damage awards resulting from the use of a 
precise or a round request, not the average award for both precise and round re-
quests.80
IV. RESULTS
The results supported the main hypothesis of this study.  The group that was 
given the $497,000 request averaged $387,274 in punitive damages.  The group 
that was given the $500,000 request averaged $359,370 in punitive damages. 
And the group that was given the $503,000 request averaged $377,108 in puni-
tive damages.  Therefore, the average of the two precise requests was $382,191, 
which is $22,821 more than the round request. 
 79. Loschelder, Stuppi & Trotschel, supra note 3, at 492. Meaning, the more someone 
knows about a subject, the less likely they are to be affected by anchoring. 
 80. Meaning, it is irrelevant if conservatives and males award lesser amounts on average 
across all three versions of the survey (precise low, round, precise high). What matters is if the pre-
cise requests resulted in higher awards than the round requests. 
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As predicted, participants who identified as conservative returned lower 
awards on average than participants who identified as liberal.81  The average 
punitive damage award from conservatives was $305,828 while the average pu-
nitive damage award from liberals was $507,207.  Contrary to the initial predic-
tion, males returned higher awards than females.  Male participants averaged 
$402,393, while females averaged $329,693.  This finding is even more peculiar 
when one considers that the male participants were slightly more likely to be 
conservative and the female participants slightly more likely to be liberal.82 
While these findings may have relevance for the consideration of demographics 
in jury selection, they are largely irrelevant to the ultimate finding of this study, 
which is designed to measure differences attributable to the use of either precise 
or round punitive damage requests, not the average award from round and pre-
cise requests. 
 
 81. For purposes of this study, “liberal” is defined as a response of 0–30 on a 0–100 Likert 
scale, in which 0 is labeled “extremely liberal” and 100 is labeled “extremely conservative.” Like-
wise, “conservative” is defined as a response of 70–100 on the same scale. 
 82. Female participants averaged 48.1 on the 0–100 Likert scale, in which 0 is labeled “ex-
tremely liberal” and 100 is labeled “extremely conservative.” Male participants averaged 49.6 on 
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It was determined that the more nuanced analysis of how the anchoring ef-
fect differed among the various demographic groups was unable to be conclud-
ed from this research due to limited sample size.  While 609 responses are more 
than adequate to draw conclusions from the data overall, each participant was 
only asked about one of the three possible scenarios.  Therefore, when respons-
es are divided into demographic subgroups, the number of responses for each of 
the three case summaries quickly diminishes to an insufficient level.  Existing 
literature provides evidence to suggest that subject-matter experience results in 
a diminished anchoring effect.83  But there is little evidence to suggest that de-
mographic factors such as gender would have a significant effect.84 
V.  DISCUSSION 
A. General 
It is ultimately unknowable if the reason that the precise requests returned 
larger awards than the round request is due to participants assuming that there 
was a legitimate, objective basis for the precise requests.  Existing research 
 
 83. David D. Loschelder et al., The Too-Much-Precision Effect: When and Why Precise An-
chors Backfire with Experts, 27 PSYCH. SCI. 1573 (2016). 
 84. But see Andrea Caputo, Relevant Information, Personality Traits and Anchoring Effect, 
13 INT. J. MGMT. & DECISION MAKING 62, 70–71 (2014) (“A gender effect seems to exist; female 
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strongly suggests that this is the best explanation for the disparate results in this 
study.85  It is human nature to assume that a speaker will only express infor-
mation in a manner that is no more precise than his subject-matter knowledge 
warrants.86  Indeed, the use of precise estimates is correlated with higher confi-
dence levels.87  This tendency is likely even more pervasive in a courtroom set-
ting where jurors are unfamiliar with the procedures and assume subject-matter 
expertise on the part of the attorneys.  Jurors may even assume some type of 
unbeknownst-to-them pre-trial hearing based on the facts of the case that result-
ed in a plaintiff’s attorney being given permission to make such a precise puni-
tive damage request.  All of this would result in the jurors’ perceiving an in-
creased legitimacy from precise punitive damage requests.  This increased 
perception of legitimacy would naturally lead to awards closer to the requested 
amount. 
It is ultimately a subjective determination as to whether the differences pro-
duced in this study are highly disparate or not.  The average of the two precise 
requests is $382,191, which is $22,821 more than the average from the round 
request. This is only a 6% difference.  However, the significance of using pre-
cise punitive damage requests must be considered in light of the effort required 
to obtain the benefit.  Such consideration illustrates the efficiency of the prac-
tice.  It requires no extra research, preparation, or any other allotment of re-
sources for a plaintiff’s attorney to request $497,000 in punitive damages in-
stead of $500,000.  Furthermore, in the judicial setting there are no known 
negative effects that need to be weighed against the benefits.  Of course, the 
findings of this research do not prove that requesting $497,000 instead of 
$500,000 is guaranteed to result in a higher verdict—rather, only that it is more 
likely to result in a higher verdict. 
In the literature regarding precise number anchoring, it is somewhat anoma-
lous for the lower precise anchor to return higher estimates than the higher pre-
cise anchor, as occurred in this study.88  For example, the 2012 Mason et al. 
study contained seven surveys regarding the anchoring effects of precise num-
bers.89  In every survey the precise low number returned averages below the 
precise high number.90  The reason this did not occur in the present study is 
likely due to the more subjective nature of punitive damages.  The examples in 
the 2012 Mason et al. study involved fairly common items, such as the price of 
 85. See Mason et al., supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also Alexandra Jerez-
Fernandez et al., supra note 35. 
 86. See Mason et al., supra note 1, at 760. 
 87. MATTHEW B. WELSH ET AL., NUMBER PREFERENCE, PRECISION AND IMPLICIT 
CONFIDENCE 1521, 1521–26 (L. Carlson, C. Hölscher & T. Shipley eds., 2011). 
 88. The lower precise anchor ($497,000) averaged $387,274, while the higher precise anchor 
($503,000) averaged $377,108. 
 89. Mason et al., supra note 1, at 760 tbl. 1. 
 90. Id. at 760–62. 
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a textbook, coffee, and a used car.91  Determining the appropriate amount of pu-
nitive damages necessary to punish a company is a far more subjective and non-
routine determination.  This result is also largely irrelevant to the ultimate find-
ing of this study: that precise punitive damage requests result in higher jury 
awards than round punitive damage requests.  The reason two different precise 
numbers are utilized is to illustrate that it is the precise nature of the numbers 
that cause the higher end result and not the fact that the precise number happens 
to be slightly higher than the round number.92
The preceding explanations for the results of this study are consistent with 
explanations from prior studies regarding how higher punitive damage requests 
result in higher verdicts.93  In both instances, the jury interprets the rationale for 
the plaintiff’s attorney’s request to be due to the presence of some—
unbeknownst to them—legitimate, objective explanation.  This lends validity to 
the plaintiff’s attorney’s request, therefore causing jurors to not deviate as far 
from the plaintiff’s attorney’s request. 
Although not analyzed by the methodology of this research, it is likely that 
precise punitive damage requests would be even more effective when an ex-
tremely high initial request is made.  This is because the two anchoring princi-
ples of higher initial numbers resulting in higher final numbers and precise ini-
tial numbers resulting in higher numbers may have a synergistic effect.  When a 
plaintiff’s attorney makes a high request for punitive damages, adding precision 
to the figure may function to lend plausibility to the high anchor.94  Jurors who 
otherwise would be skeptical of such a high initial request may assume that 
there must be some legitimate reason for such a high request; otherwise, why 
would the number be so precise? 
Although beyond the scope of this research, the findings are likely wel-
comed by tort-reform groups that advocate for caps on punitive damages.  
These advocates often point to the unpredictable nature of punitive damage 
awards as evidence for proposed reforms.95  The finding that punitive damages 
are affected by factors that have no bearing on the defendant’s culpability or the 
plaintiff’s damages—such as the level of precision in the request—demonstrates 
the inconsistent nature of punitive damage awards. 
 91. Id. at 761–63. 
 92. Meaning, if this study only used $503,000 and $500,000 then it could not be concluded 
that the $503,000 request returned higher verdicts because of its precise nature, because this result 
could instead be contributed to the traditional anchoring effect where larger numbers naturally re-
turn larger awards. 
 93. See supra note 13 and text accompanying notes 13–15. 
 94. Loschelder, Stuppi & Trotschel, supra note 3, at 492. 
 95. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 499 (2008) (“The real problem, it seems, is 
the stark unpredictability of punitive awards.”); Theodore B. Olson, The Dangerous National Sport 
of Punitive Damages, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 1994), at A17 (“The system is a perverse combination of 
lottery and bullfighting, selecting beneficiaries and gargets almost at random and inflicting brutal 
punishment on the latter if they wander into the arena.”). 
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B.  Civil Defense Attorney Relevance 
The significance of this research to plaintiffs’ attorneys is obvious.  The 
significance for civil defense attorneys, however, is unclear.  Plaintiffs’ attor-
neys can easily implement precise figures in their punitive damage requests.  
But there is no clear tactic available for civil defense attorneys to either reduce 
the effects of a plaintiff’s precise request or to utilize a precise request of their 
own.  Perhaps they could explain to juries the baseless nature of the plaintiff’s 
attorney’s precise punitive damage request.  This may be effective assuming 
that the reason for the precise figure’s effectiveness is that it leads jurors to be-
lieve there must be some legitimate, objective reason for the precise request. 
However, research on cognitive anchoring demonstrates that even this might not 
be enough to overcome the anchoring bias.  Cognitive anchoring is so highly 
prevalent that “it has proved to be almost impossible to reduce. . . .”96  Recall 
that the anchoring effect was present even in studies in which the participants 
knew that the anchor was random97 or absurd.98
However, two studies have produced potential mitigation strategies.  One 
found that the implementation of a procedural priming task can reduce the mag-
nitude of the anchoring effect.99  The study randomly assigned participants into 
two groups.100  The first group was instructed to find similarities between two 
images, while the other group was instructed to find differences.101  Both groups 
were then given an anchoring test.102  While both groups ultimately fell prey to 
the anchoring bias, the group given the procedural priming task of finding dif-
ferences fared better than its counterpart which looked for similarities.103  A 
second study showed that implementing a “consider-the-opposite” strategy, in 
which one actively generates reasons why the anchor is inappropriate, also min-
imized anchoring bias.104  The results of these two studies suggest that if de-
fense attorneys were able to place jurors in a more critical mindset, it might help 
the jury minimize the anchoring effect produced by a precise punitive damage 
request. 
 96. Thomas Mussweiler, The Malleability of Anchoring Effects, 49 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.
67, 71 (2002). 
 97. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
 98. See supra notes 21–23. 
 99. Mussweiler, supra note 96, at 70. 
 100. Id. at 69. 
 101. Id. at 70. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Thomas Mussweiler, Fritz Strack & Tim Pfeiffer, Overcoming the Inevitable Anchoring 
Effect: Considering the Opposite Compensates for Selective Accessibility, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. BULL. 1142 (2000). 
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In a traditional negotiation over the price of an item, both sides can use pre-
cise numbers to their advantage.105  Both buyers and sellers are less likely to 
give an extremely divergent counteroffer when the initial offer—whether by the 
buyer or seller—is precise.106  Unfortunately for civil defense attorneys, this is 
not the case with punitive damage requests.  This is because in a civil case in-
volving potential punitive damages the defense attorney does not just want low 
punitive damages; he wants no punitive damages, and it is impossible to anchor 
the jury to a number lower than $0 since negative punitive damages do not ex-
ist.107  A defense attorney’s punitive damage request of $0 neglects to capitalize 
on the anchoring effect for two reasons.  First, it does not deviate from the actu-
al, desired $0 amount. Second, it is not precise.  The defense attorney is further 
disadvantaged because the act of explaining to the jury how the plaintiff’s re-
quest is too high or suspiciously precise may serve to validate the notion that 
some amount of punitive damages are warranted—it is just a matter of how 
much. 
C.  Future Research 
The results of this study invite replication with variation in future research.  
A study involving even more precise anchors could be tested.  Existing research 
suggests that the more precise request of $497,325 would yield even higher jury 
awards than the moderately precise request used in this research of $497,000.108
Additionally, the effects of precision on low anchors could be tested.  Using the 
same case summary, low, round punitive damage requests of $100,000 could be 
compared to low, precise punitive damage requests of $98,750 and $101,250.  
Here, mock jurors would likely adjust their awards upward rather than down-
ward, as in the present study.  This could result in the more precise request net-
ting lower average awards due to mock jurors perceiving the requested amounts 
as more legitimate.  This would serve as a cautionary lesson for plaintiffs’ at-
torneys to only utilize precise requests when they are also high.  Finally, a dif-
ferent version of this study could include rebuttals from defense attorneys in the 
case summary to determine the most effective strategies to counteract a plain-
 105. Loschelder, Stuppi & Trotschel, supra note 3, at 494 (finding that the use of precise 
numbers strengthened the anchoring effect for both initial offers and counteroffers). 
 106. Id.
 107. To further illustrate, in a traditional negotiation over the price of an item that is worth 
$10,000, the seller can attempt to anchor the negotiation to a high number, such as $13,000. And the 
buyer can attempt to anchor the negotiation to a low number, such as $7,000. In the former example, 
a final price of $10,000 would be significantly less than the initial $13,000 price. And in the latter 
example, a final price of $10,000 would be significantly more than the initial $7,000 price. In a case 
involving the potential for around $100,000 in punitive damages, the plaintiff’s attorney is free to go 
high with an initial request of, say, $302,750, thus anchoring the jury to a high and precise number. 
But if the goal of the defense attorney is $0 in punitive damages, the best he can do is ask for $0, 
which is neither low nor precise. 
 108. See supra note 46. 
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tiff’s attorney’s use of precise anchors.  Perhaps explaining that the precise na-
ture of the plaintiff’s attorney’s request is baseless would cause jurors to view 
the plaintiff’s attorney’s behavior as manipulative and result in lower awards as 
punishment.  Conversely, the defense attorney’s discussion of the precise 
amount requested by the plaintiff’s attorney could cause the number to be even 
more strongly ingrained in the minds of the jurors, thus increasing its potency as 
an anchor. 
VI. CONCLUSION
While the anchoring effect on trial outcomes is well documented, this study 
is the first to measure the effects of precise punitive damage requests.  The re-
sults are consistent with literature in other areas in that precise punitive damage 
requests resulted in higher jury awards.  This is likely due to jurors perceiving a 
precise request as more legitimate, which then strengthens the anchoring effect 
of the request.  The significant effect of using a precise punitive damage re-
quest—combined with the ease of such a strategy—provides a strong incentive 
for plaintiffs’ attorneys to implement such a strategy. 
The significance of this research is further illustrated in the lack of any 
downside to such a precise damage award request and the uncertainty regarding 
an effective mitigation strategy from the defense.  The results of this study also 
contribute to the illumination of the subjective nature of juror decision-making 
more generally.  Finally, the results of this study invite replication with varia-
tion in future research. 
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VII. APPENDIX A
You are serving on the jury in a case involving a man who was severely in-
jured from the water heater in his house.  A design defect caused the water 
heater to build up too much pressure, resulting in an explosion.  Documents re-
veal that the design defect was known to the company but they decided not to 
recall the defective water heaters reasoning that it would hurt their reputation 
and that the explosions would be rare.  The annual revenue of the manufacturer 
is $36 million and their annual profits are $4 million.  The local man who was 
injured has already received $32,000 which fully compensates him for the dam-
ages to his house and his injuries, including pain and suffering. 
Your job is to decide whether to apply punitive damages against the manu-
facturer.  Punitive damages are allowed when mere compensation is not enough 
to punish the behavior of the defendant.  The plaintiff is asking for punitive 
damages of [$497,000/$500,000/$503,000].  Assuming all the facts in this 
summary are true, how much, if any, punitive damages would you have the 
manufacturer pay (do not include the $32,000 he has already received)? 
